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Schor shows; shooting this particular fish involves making fun of the 
fact that Schor and Bowsher v. Synar were decided on the same day) 
when such formalism is not apparently as attractive elsewhere in 
the law? The project would involve trying to figure out the relation-
ship between formalism-pragmatism and conservatism-liberalism 
(not meaning to suggest by this construction that the parallelism is 
accurate) in the present period. 
The overall difficulty for constitutional law scholarship is that 
its producers, by our specialized training and our inclinations, are 
much better at dealing with Supreme Court cases than we are at 
doing anything else. Perhaps people with interdisciplinary train-
ing-in philosophy, political science, or history-will come up with 
some novel perspectives on constitutional law. Yet I note a struc-
tural impediment to the realization of that possibility: With rare 
exceptions, interdisciplinarians at or near the top of their other dis-
ciplines are unlikely to want to teach in a law school, preferring the 
company of those immersed in the other discipline. That means 
that, again with rare exceptions, people who do constitutional law 
scholarship and have interdisciplinary training or interests are un-
likely to produce truly provocative work drawing on that training 
or interest. 
In my view, the lines of analysis of the cases have just about 
played themselves out. Maybe the time has come to start doing 
something else. (Of course, I may be willing to say that because I 
have just published a book on constitutional theory that I unsur-
prisingly but undoubtedly erroneously regard as the last word on 
the subject, and maybe all that I mean is that the time has come for 
me to start doing something else.) 
CHARLES A. LOFGREN9 
In view of the past fifty years of history under the Constitution, 
I find it difficult to think of many-if any-areas of American life 
not open to further examination by constitutional scholars. Cer-
tainly historians, whose domain is perhaps broader than that of 
their constitutional cousins in other disciplines, should greet the Bi-
centennial with renewed appreciation for Andrew McLaughlin's vi-
sion in 1935: "Constitutional history . . . , when viewed in its 
entirety, is of almost limitless extent, because to comprehend it fully 
one must have in mind social and industrial change and move-
ment." Indeed, recent decades have suggested that McLaughlin 
9. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College, and member of the Graduate Faculty in History of the Claremont Colleges. 
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was overly cautious when he opined that "actual social need and ... 
imperative adjustment" made their impressions "even though the 
waves of time often seem to dash in vain against the walls of habit 
and of established practice." The "waves of time" have had a gen-
erous assist from the nation's judges, giving new force to Toc-
queville's insight about the penchant of Americans to turn political 
questions into legal ones. 
Practically speaking, that is, more and more stories wait to be 
told. Cases in their multitudinous dimensions; organizations that 
pushed litigation; judges and "courts"; the real effects of and reac-
tions to judicial activity in various areas-these are some of the 
most obvious foci for attention. And the riches are more striking 
when one takes account of activity at the state level. (As a Califor-
nia resident, I can't resist pleading for someone to take on a history 
of the Rose Bird years, which, I suspect, would offer a wonderful 
opportunity for a microcosmic examination of concerns about judi-
cial "activism.") 
Yet the profession-and I write here with an eye primarily on 
historians, leaving it to others to offer prescriptions for their own 
fields-should keep in mind the potential for breadth in constitu-
tional studies. The sexiness-not to mention the relative manage-
ability-of case- and court-related issues can easily lead to slighting 
other areas. Even if the commerce clause has ceased to be on the 
cutting edge of constitutional law, for example, its significance in 
what I like to call the de facto constitution of government in 
America continues unabated. We need studies from a constitu-
tional perspective of state-federal relationships and influences com-
parable to Harry N. Scheiber's investigations into the nineteenth 
century economy. w The activities of state and federal regulatory 
bodies of all sorts also deserve attention. 
Nor should the richness of the recent past blind us to earlier 
periods. I was struck, while doing my book on P/essy v. Ferguson, 
by how little we really know about civil rights in operation in the 
late nineteenth century. Although I dealt with about two dozen 
state appellate and federal cases on transportation segregation, I 
barely probed the law in action at the local level. Even one of the 
major cases, Hall v. DeCuir (1878), still awaits a historian, despite 
its pivotal importance for both the constitutional and private-law 
aspects of race relations, and despite an immensely rich case his-
I 0. Indeed, Scheiber's own assessment of the challenges in constitutional history de-
serves attention from anyone wondering about what needs doing. See Scheiber, American 
Constitutional History and the New Legal History: Complementary Themes in Two Modes, 68 
J. AMER. HIST. 337 (1981). 
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tory. J. Morgan Kousser, it needs noting, is working on what 
promises to be the definitive study of school segregation in the pe-
riod, but schools hardly exhaust the realm of social intercourse. 
Nor, to shift areas, is the "original intent" vein played out. 
Whatever the outcome of current political and theoretical contro-
versies, the subject offers almost endless historical fascination. (My 
Claremont colleague, Leonard Levy, will satisfy some of our curios-
ity when he soon completes his comprehensive book on the inten-
tions behind the Constitution's leading clauses. From a peek at 
several of his chapters, I can attest that the book is worth waiting 
for.) Then, too, a historian might try his or her hand at offering a 
broad interpretation of shifts in approaches to constitutional inter-
pretation over the last century, by both judges and academicians. 
Here I do not mean to downplay G. Edward White's contributions, 
but only to suggest the usefulness of a synthesis sweeping from the 
late nineteenth century to the current interpretivist/non-interpre-
tivist debate. 
I must confess, however, to having lately yielded to the charms 
of the recent past by beginning a constitutional history of the Viet-
nam War, which is now somewhere between the prenatal and natal 
stages. As I struggle with a conceptual framework for it, I find my-
self wishing for a sure guide to the boundaries connoted by "consti-
tutional." That, of course, is wishing for what never will be, but my 
experience may suggest that even workaday historians could benefit 
from still more discussion of the meaning of constitutions and con-
stitutionalism within an American framework-yet at a level that 
stays beneath the clouds. Court cases, pronouncements from the 
executive branch, congressional debate, actual interbranch relation-
ships, inflation, domestic spying, stolen documents, crunched heads, 
parading workers, destroyed files, disrupted lives, death-the ques-
tion is where to draw the line. A history of everything becomes a 
history of nothing. 
But I conclude on a more pedestrian note-yet one warranted 
I think by Constitutional Commentary's admirable concern for 
teaching as well as research. We need a good source book for un-
dergraduate constitutional history courses. Stanley Kuder's 
casebook is useful, but unless one defines the field as exclusively a 
history of what the United States Supreme Court has done, it is 
incomplete. One approach might take its cue from Stephen Presser 
and Jamil Zainaldin's collection in American legal history. My own 
preference, however, would be for something with a less elaborate 
editorial apparatus and fewer (if any) secondary readings, but in-
cluding both cases and other primary materials; such a book could 
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be used in conjunction with a text, paperbacks, assigned chapters 
and articles, or some combination thereof. My mind runs fondly 
back to the collection (now out of print) edited by James Morton 
Smith and Paul Murphy, perhaps because it helped introduce me to 
the field nearly three decades ago. 
MICHAEL ZUCKERTII 
A preliminary comment. In most fields there is a range of 
opinion among competent practitioners as to what constitutes the 
current agenda for the field. In that, I feel safe in predicting, this 
symposium will prove constitutional studies to be no exception. Yet 
constitutional studies differs from many other disciplines, e.g., bio-
chemistry, in that in the latter all competent observers share a fairly 
common picture of where the field currently is, and of what the 
major unsettled issues are. There may be disagreements over priori-
ties among the important questions, or over the proper leads to fol-
low in examining them, or at worst, a fairly well-structured set of 
alternative conceptions of the current state and agenda for the field 
resting on what have come to be called "competing paradigms." 
But constitutional studies is not so well-structured as that, with the 
result that any attempt to speak of a current agenda is rather per-
sonal. That at least is true of my comments. 
Today constitutional scholars face two tasks: to repoliticize 
the Constitution and to depoliticize constitutional law. The Bicen-
tennial season has encouraged many of us to pay close attention to 
constitutional history, and especially to the doings of the founders. 
One of my most abiding conclusions is how different our approach 
to the Constitution is from that of the founders. We are far more 
legalistic than they-witness the fact that most scholarly discus-
sions of the Constitution occur in law journals. But the founders, 
though many were trained as lawyers, and a few even practiced law, 
approached the Constitution not in a legalistic but in a political 
manner. I do not mean, by the way, to endorse the view of, e.g., 
John Roche, that the founders were merely local pols cutting deals, 
but rather to insist that they saw the Constitution preeminently as a 
part of political science, as a way of structuring political life. The 
kinds of argument and reasoning one finds in the Constitutional 
Convention or The Federalist have, for the most part, much more in 
common with the kinds of questions political scientists ask than 
those lawyers ask. The question about representation, for example, 
is not the abstract one about rights, but rather the political one of 
II. Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
